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Many family firms find it difficult to reach their fourth generation; nevertheless, 
these firms have some features that may help them to achieve success and 
longevity. This thesis tries to identify some critical issues that often prevent 
family companies to survive over time and tries to analyse how family company 
Jerónimo Martins could overcome obstacles and achieved success and 
longevity through a good management of the interference of the family sphere 
in the work sphere. 
Keywords: Family Business, Business and Familiar Planning, Corporate 
Governance, Succession, Generation, Longevity. 
 
Resumo 
Muitas empresas familiares têm dificuldade em atingir a quarta geração. No 
entanto, estas empresas têm algumas características que podem ajuda-las a 
alcançar o sucesso e a longevidade. Esta tese tenta identificar algumas 
questões críticas que muitas vezes impedem as empresas familiares de 
sobreviver ao longo do tempo e tenta analisar como a empresa familiar 
Jerónimo Martins conseguiu ultrapassar obstáculos e alcançar o sucesso e a 
longevidade através de uma boa gestão da interferência da esfera familiar na 
esfera do trabalho. 
Palavras-chave: Empresas Familiares, Planeamento Empresarial e Familiar, 
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Several studies suggest that family firms find it difficult to reach their 
fourth generation and, actually, a popular axiom says: "the first generation starts 
a business. The second generation runs it. And the third generation ruins it." 
However, other authors underline that these firms have some features, which, 
together with proper succession planning, good managers and skilled human 
resources, can drive them to longevity. A good example of this is Jerónimo 
Martins (JM), a family firm that proudly tells its tale: “We crossed five political 
systems, the French invasion, two world wars, four revolutions and the Chiado 
fire.” 
This self-presentation was part of an advertisement of JM in 1989; and 
actually it illustrates quite well their curriculum vitae. They are not only a famous 
Portuguese family firm but one of the biggest Portuguese companies competing 
with world giant groups in a tough sector in Portugal, Poland and Colombia. It 
has been in the hands of the dos Santos family for four generations and before 
it had been controlled by the Martins family for three generations. If the family 
issue was a handicap for JM to survive during the final Martins years, it is 
definitely not so now with the dos Santos family.  
 
This case study tries to answer two questions in order to know how this 
family firm could achieve longevity: (1) How is the interference of the family 
sphere in the work sphere managed, and (2) How each family leader continues 
the legacy while adapting to changing times and introducing his own vision. The 
first question covers some issues that are thought to be vital in family firms, 
such as: the interaction between family and business; governance; 
entrepreneurship; succession. The second one regards the importance of each 
generation, new challenges and the way the company culture is updated. Using 
a scope of the 221 years of JM, this study will focus on the dos Santos period 
and use some examples, especially from the last 20 years. 
 
This thesis starts with a review of literature which raises some questions 
to be analysed afterwards. Then, it introduces Jerónimo Martins and offers 
some relevant data and indicators. Finally, the questions raised are discussed 
regarding the Jerónimo Martins case. 
 
 
1. Family Business 
Family businesses are the prevailing form of enterprise in the whole 
world (Gersick, Davis, McCollom-Hampton and Lansberg, 1997). In 2008, about 
70 to 80% of the firms in Portugal were family-owned, thus contributing to more 
than 60% of the GDP and around 50% of the workforce. The family business 
concept is, nowadays, often undervalued in Portugal and the family firm is often 
seen as an “outdated, small and unprofessionally managed firm” (Coimbra, 
2008). Abroad, family firms have also been criticised by the literature because 
of the lack of professional management and ‘destructive nepotism’ (Miller and 
Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003). Only about one-third 
of the family firms reach the second generation (Bammens, Voorderckers and 
Van Gils, 2008), less than 30% survive into the third one (Duffy, 2011) and only 




Although some authors believe these firms are doomed to fail, this is not 
always true in Portugal where the most important firms of the 20th century are 
family-owned (Lima, 2003). Recently, the literature has started to give a special 
attention to some factors that may help family firms to achieve longevity 
(Carney, 2005). The familial experience leads new generations to incorporate 
values, rules and practices that will have a fundamental importance in guiding 
their future life. The company is then seen as a family project, not only an 
economic one, which should be continued from generation to generation (Lima, 
2003). These firms are also recognised as an important source of funding for 
new start-ups that create employment, technological innovation and economic 
progress (Zahra, 2005; Zachary, 2011). 
 
1.1. Family and business 
The family is as important for the long-term sustainability of the family 
firm as the business itself; moreover, the business must supply income for the 
family and vice-versa (Zachary, 2011). Family firms are not homogeneous 
(Westhead and Howorth, 2007; Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012) and with the 
adjacency of work and family it is a tough and challenging task to manage them 
in an efficient way (Jaffe and Lane, 2004; Solomon, Breunlin, Panattoni, 
Gustafson, Ransburg, Ryan, Hammerman and Terrier, 2011). This complexity is 
due to the overlapping of different realities and while the family system praises 
union and harmony in social relationships, the business system is marked by 
the competitive environment (Oliveira, Albuquerque and Pereira, 2012). Often 
family issues interfere on business, even in long-lived family firms, and if the 
family has no tradition in working together it is likely that some conflicts will 
occur. Some firms offer a seminar to young and new family members to learn 
about the family holdings and the basics of financial responsibility (Jaffe and 
Lane, 2004). Business productivity and income tend to decline when the tension 
level in the family increases (Olson, Zuiker, Danes, Stafford, Heck and Duncan, 
2003). Consequently, Zachary (2011) suggests that, in order to understand the 
family business, the family and the business should be studied separately and 
in conjunction.  
 
Jaffe (2005) believes that a proper financial planning must include two 
dimensions: (1) the family’s desires and intentions for the business and, (2) the 
strategic planning for the business’ future. Thus, he proposes the creation of a 
Family Council and a Board of Directors.  
 
The Family Council must deal with the business of the family, develop a 
new generation of family members, regulate the involvement of family members 
in the business and align the business with the family’s plan. The Council 
secures the future in four areas: Mission and Values; next generation 
development plan; guidelines for family involvement; and share ownership and 
transfer policies. It includes both the members of the family who are not 
connected with the business and those who are.  
 
The primary task of the Board of Directors is to look at the business 
independently from the needs of the family. The Board includes the main 
shareholders, family members who play key roles, key nonfamily executives 
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and independent nonfamily directors or advisors. The Board focuses on four 
areas of strategic planning: business renewal; capital needs; key employees 
and succession governance (Jaffe and Lane, 2004; Jaffe, 2005).  
 
Family goals tend to be more important for family managed firms, whilst 
financial ones tend to have an increased importance when ownership is diluted 
and non-family members control management (Westhead and Howorth, 2007). 
 
Moderate levels of task conflicts may generate new ideas if they are 
arbitrated by a competent board (Bammens et al., 2008). Jaffe (2005) believes 
that destructive conflict can be minimised if family members make agreements. 
As the family grows, new generations may have an insufficient understanding of 
the founder’s intents and values. They have different needs, desires and 
concerns and thus it is harder to find a unified voice. Distrust grows too and 
some members may want to leave because they inherited the business and did 
not choose to be part of it. Going public in these situations may be beneficial 
because market provides liquidity and the valuing process is objective. The 
sense of cause and effect on the management of assets must be developed so 
that family members have a sense of fiduciary responsibility, understand their 
role in the business, have a reasonable expectation of return, understand risk 
and are willing to be part of important decisions (Jaffe and Lane, 2004). 
 
Tucker (2011) believes these firms represent one of the most complex 
business models and that it is important to focus on the emotional and relational 
aspects in order to overcome family conflicts that may affect the future of the 
firm. Not all family firms are prepared to admit that they have a problem 
because, for them, it would be like admitting they have problems inside their 
families. Thus, a poor performance or any other issue is blamed on business 
causes and not on family conflicts. While many structural or operating changes 
take place, some attitudes or behaviours, actually, remain the same. To 
conclude, the author also states that many families solve their issues to the 
common agreement of their members, which may not always be the best 
decision for the business.  
 
Question 1: How is the interference of the family sphere in the 




Family firms may have capital constraints that can discourage the firm’s 
growth (Carney, 2005). Two of the reasons may be the ‘ever-increasing’ needs 
of a growing family and the scepticism by financial markets (Miller and Le 
Breton-Miller, 2006). The adoption of some corporate governance ideas may 
help family firms, specially the larger ones (Oliveira et al., 2012). Governance 
helps to avoid conflicts between family members and to preserve the unity 
(Bammens et al., 2008). Furthermore, the competitive advantage of a family 
firm can arise from a corporate governance system. Family governance 
systems have three outstanding “propensities” that can overcome capital 
constraints: ‘Parsimony’; ‘Personalism’; and ‘Particularism’. As, generally, 
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people are more prudent with their own money, the unification of ownership and 
control can reduce agency costs, the tendency toward opportunism and 
motivate efficiency and an accurate resource conservation and allocation. This 
is quite advantageous in scarce environments. The personalisation of authority 
may allow the family to enterprise its own vision onto the business. Owner-
managers rely largely upon arm’s length transitions and maintain close relations 
with a subset of reliable partners. The combination of ‘Personalism’ and 
‘Particularism’ can be advantageous in accumulating and using social capital 
and these three propensities can generate competitive advantages (Carney, 
2005).  
 
One of the most important benefits of owner-management is its 
stewardship motivation, which is strengthened by its past, present and future 
being tied to the firm’s reputation. Superior attitudes of stewardship may help a 
family firm surpass a non-family firm because managers and owners are moved 
by more than economic self-interest, trying to strengthen the firm and its people. 
However, left unchecked, family management can be dangerous (Miller and Le 
Breton-Miller, 2006). Incompetent family leaders can ruin family fortunes; thus, 
as the firm grows, the need for professional standards and accountability grows 
too. An effective Board is extremely important for successful operation, 
especially in crisis (Jaffe and Lane, 2004). 
 
A substantial part of the failures of many firms could be avoided by 
implementing a Board of Directors, which has different characteristics and 
needs in different generational stages of the firm due to the changes in family 
attributes, such as task conflict, family experience and intentional trust. Task 
conflict increases over generations because new members may have a different 
view about the firm and the business. Passive family shareholders also tend to 
increase; furthermore, while active family members are likely to focus on long-
term performance, passive shareholders are likely to prefer short-term dividend 
pay-outs. Family business experience and skills increase as new generations 
get involved, because parents often share tacit organizational knowledge and 
wisdom with their children. Intentional trust, one of the main advantages of 
family firms, tends to decrease over generations as there are fewer social 
interactions and family members usually care more about their own nuclear 
household rather than on the welfare of whole family. As a combined impact of 
these factors, the need of Board advice decreases from the first generation to 
the second, and then rises again in third and subsequent generation firms 
(Bammens et al., 2008).  
 
Independent directors and non-family influential shareholders can bring 
knowledge, incentive to monitor managers and give a better protection to 
minority shareholders (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006); however, these firms 
usually employ less professional managers and these are forced to focus on 
day-to-day operating details and not on strategic planning (Carney, 2005). 
 
Outside Board members may bring new directions and perspectives 
(Jain, 1980; Sharma, Chrisman and Chua, 1997), help the company and act as 
arbitrators (Mace, 1971; Lane, 1989). However, some authors are sceptical and 
argue that outside Board members have less knowledge about the firm and its 
11 
 
environment, less authority and less availability (Ford, 1988). Jonovic (1989) 
believes that the need for outside members can be compensated with financial 
and strategic planning and control systems. 
 
As the firm grows and the number of non-family managers increases, 
there is a need to use formal control systems and structures (Bammens et al., 
2008) which may reduce the firm’s flexibility to adapt to environmental changes. 
Therefore, while the founder has more freedom to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities based on intuition, these activities in third generation and beyond firms 
are more planned and based on conventional strategies (Cruz and Nordqvist, 
2012).  
 
SQ1.1: What is JM’s governance system and how is it related to the 
overlap of the family and business’ spheres? 
 
 
1.1.2. Performance and Entrepreneurship 
In a family business the goals of the firm and the family are often linked. 
Families have unique dynamics that can play an important role in the creation 
and sustainability of entrepreneurial behaviours (Zachary, 2011). The 
organizational culture of these firms is an important strategic resource that may 
offer a distinct competitive advantage over rivals by promoting and sustaining 
entrepreneurial activities (Zahra, Hayton and Salvato, 2004; Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2006). The overlap of the family and the business can create 
competitive advantages for family firms (Gersick et al., 1997; Zahra et al., 
2004). 
 
Effective corporate entrepreneurship is advantageous for any kind of 
firm, especially nowadays with the quick changes on the competitive 
environment and the trend of short-life cycles on businesses and products. It 
also helps firms to exploit their competitive advantages as well as to explore 
new opportunities (Zellweger and Sieger, 2012). Besides helping the firm to 
revitalise its business and stay competitive (Zahra et al., 2004; Zahra, 2005; 
Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012; Zellweger and Sieger, 2012), a continued 
entrepreneurship, continued family involvement and professional management 
are important for a family firm (Westhead and Howorth, 2007). But, while it is 
essential for firms, entrepreneurship consumes time and resources and it is 
risky (Zahra, 2005).  
 
As the family firm evolves, challenges increase and owners and 
managers must face these changes as the family and the business often 
develop and grow in different ways (Jaffe and Lane, 2004; Cruz and Nordqvist, 
2012). Changes include the degree of family identification, influence and 
personal investment (Gersick et al., 1997; Schulze et al., 2003; Cruz and 
Nordqvist, 2012).  
 
According to Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006), the combination of long-
term orientation, low turnover and ‘prevailing socio-cognitive familial bonds’ help 
family firms to create advantages over non-family firms. Long tenures can drive 
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leaders to take a cautious steward viewpoint of the business. Usually, they 
dislike unrelated diversifications, risky acquisitions or short-sighted downsizing. 
At the same time, they invest in long-term projects (eg. Infrastructure creation 
and R&D) and lengthy tenures give them a deep knowledge of the company 
and the business. In comparison to many public traded non-family firms, there is 
less pressure to achieve quick results, there is a concern for subsequent 
generations and there are more resources to invest due to lower agency costs.  
 
Yet, while some factors can help family firms to be entrepreneurial, these 
firms can follow conservative strategies over time, become risk-averse and 
experience ‘strategic simplicity’ by using always the same strategies that 
worked in the past (Zahra et al., 2004; Zahra, 2005; Zellweger and Sieger, 
2012). As past successes can become liabilities, a sole dependence on 
exploitation can lead to various disadvantages. Thus, in order to achieve a long-
term survival it is mandatory to explore new opportunities too. Investing 
simultaneously in multiple levels of innovation is vital. Successful 
multigenerational family firms usually explore new opportunities and exploit the 
ones that have been discovered or created (Sharma and Salvato, 2011). 
 
Family ownership and involvement stimulate entrepreneurship but long 
CEO tenures can have the opposite effect (Zahra, 2005). Moderate levels of 
individualism, high external cultural orientation, decentralisation and strategic 
control are associated with higher levels of entrepreneurship, while focussing on 
financial controls (short-term orientation) has a negative impact (Zahra et al., 
2004). External investors and non-family managers can help the firm in 
fostering entrepreneurship (Salvato, 2004; Carney, 2005).  
 
Moderate levels of family ownership lead to a greater international 
entrepreneurship, while higher levels can lead to stagnation. Thus, opening the 
company to non-family owners may help family firms engaging in international 
ventures. On the one hand, it can help to overcome typical financial constraints 
of family businesses and provide technological and human resources. But, on 
the other hand, the risk is shared and the family has fewer reasons to fear 
(Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan and Pieper, 2012).  
 
Family dynasties usually take a long-term view of wealth creation and 
often act also under non-financial goals (Jaffe and Lane, 2004). Altruism in 
family firms makes them unique due to transfers of history, identity and 
language; moreover, it can cultivate loyalty and commitment too (Schulze et al., 
2003). The “familiness” concept, which differentiates family firms from others, 
results from this unique interaction among the family unit, the business entity 
and the individual family members. Family firms whose goal is transgenerational 
wealth creation generate “distinctive familiness” (resources and capabilities) 
that may lead to positive and synergistic outcomes and thus be competitive over 
time (Habbershon, Williams and MacMillan, 2003).  
 
Family firms can follow two directions: (1) become public or become 
considerably large with professional management or (2) sell its core business 





SQ1.2: Why is entrepreneurship important not only for JM’s 




Executive successions are sometimes influenced by familiar caprices 
rather than by competence (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006) and they are a 
challenging process due to the intersection of ownership, management and 
family (Gersick et al., 1997).  
 
Brun de Pontet, Wrosch and Cagne (2007) argue that successions are 
more than a mere change of roles and responsibilities. When both generations 
control the business, their relationship and the business can be at risk if the 
successor remains in the incumbent’s shadow. Thus, the “optimal” succession 
happens when there is a progressive decline in the incumbent’s control and a 
progressive growth of the successor’s abilities and authority. These authors 
also state that family harmony and trust, business factors, previous experience 
with succession, the Board’s influence and a possible emotional obligation of 
choosing a successor from the family affects succession. 
 
Experience and demonstrated competence influence the successor’s 
authority (Tharenou, 2001). However, Lima (2003) stated that many Portuguese 
family firms found it important to choose a successor from the family (with the 
same surname) in order to positively influence stakeholders.  
 
If succession is well managed there are some benefits for the business, 
such as “continuity of values and approach, strong identity and commitment, 
greater loyalty and flexibility”. If not, it may cause a long-term conflict and, in the 
worst case scenario, the cessation of the business and/or a family internal 
conflict (Duffy, 2011: 26). To prevent and resolve these situations it may be 
important to hire non-family managers (Westhead and Howorth, 2007) or to 
bring a neutral advisor to help the firm in the complex succession planning 
process (Duffy, 2011). 
 
One of the most important strategies to achieve longevity may be the 
succession within the family. Timing and having the next generation interested 
in joining and capable of managing the company are vital. The selection of the 
“best” successor depends on the goals of the firm, whether they are related to 
family harmony or to growth and profitability (Sharma et al., 1997). 
 
Sonnenfeld and Spence (1989) found four leader’s departure styles: 
monarch; general; governor; and ambassador. While in the first two styles the 
leader stays closely in touch with the firm, governors and ambassadors hold a 
distance after retirement. They say that the ambassador style is the best: he 
leads the firm to moderate levels of growth, he understands the right time to 
leave and he stays in touch as an advisor (Sharma et al., 1997). 
 





1.2. Generational issues 
Often, “a misalignment between an organizational past and future” - 
whether from excessive attachment to the past, radical rejection of the 
company’s history or an incongruous mix of past and present choices - can lead 
to failed successions (Miller, Steier and Le Breton-Miller, 2003). 
 
Every generation must have a new strategy to remain successful, 
achieve autonomy and maintain a good work relationship (Post, 1993). These 
strategies can include starting a new venture or division of the business 
(Barach, 1984) and internationalising (Gallo and Sveen, 1991).  
 
Priorities change. In the first generation the founder provides 
entrepreneurial orientation; in the second one, analysis of the competitive 
environment has an important impact on entrepreneurship; and in the third 
generation and beyond, it is the access to non-family resources that strengthen 
entrepreneurship (Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012). 
 
Q2: How does each family leader give continuity to the legacy while 
introducing his own vision? 
 
 
1.2.1. Culture  
 The leader has a strong influence on culture, values and performance of 
the firm (Schein, 1983). Sharma (2004), reviewing the literature, argues that this 
influence during and beyond their command is because of their long tenures 
and the centrality of their positions. Dyer (1988) believes that the culture of the 
family firm is very important for its success and longevity; and he identifies four 
kinds of culture: Paternalistic; Laissez-Faire; Participative; and Professional. 
These cultures vary in terms of: ‘the nature of relationships’ (i.e. hierarchical, 
group orientated or individualistic); ‘human nature’ (how the employees are 
perceived); ‘nature of truth’ (whether correct decisions have to come from the 
founder family, group decisions, professional rules, etc.); ‘orientation toward the 
environment’ (reactive, harmonizing or proactive); ‘nature of human activity’; 
‘time orientation’ (past, present and/ or future), etc.. 
 
Size, age, generation in control and type of business can influence the 
culture and decision making (Dyer, 1988; Sharma et al., 1997). To conclude, an 
environmentally sensitive culture can be vital (Hoffman, 1981).  
 
SQ2.1: How did each leader influence JM’s culture over the 





Figure 1 Research model 
 
This thesis is a historic single case study using a qualitative methodology 
and a holistic analysis (Yin, 2003). It uses different sources of evidence such as 
official documents; information available on the company’s website; articles and 
interviews from newspapers, magazines and television; non-structured 
conversations with former and current employees and two personal interviews, 
with permission to record the conversation, made specifically for this project.  
There was a concern to guarantee the confidentiality and academic character of 
this work too.  
The personal interviews consisted in one non-structured and informal 
interview with Maria de Lurdes Modesto, a former employee that worked in the 
company for more than 30 years, and one semi-structured interview to 
Alexandre Soares dos Santos. Although some say that non-structured 
interviews show a low reliability coefficient (Smith, 1993), the first conversation 
helped to understand the company culture in a certain period and to listen to 
stories from someone who knew very well the firm and two leaders. We tried to 
create a proper trust relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee, 
in which the latter would talk naturally and without pressure (Sekaran, 2000). 
Hence, there was the concern to reduce discomfort and the sense of threat felt 
by the interviewee (Foody, 1993) and thus guarantee a better information 
collection with a low interference on the answers. 
Alexandre Soares dos Santos was interviewed due to the concern to 
select the person of the company with more knowledge about this subject 
(Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty and Sutcliffe, 1990) and because he has a big role in 
JM’s current situation. This interview was semi-structured, using a pre-defined 
script with open answers (Roos and Roos, 1997) with room to approach others 
topics and avoiding to predetermine the scope of the conversation. After data 
collection a triangulation was done in order to increase construct validity and to 
find the key issues of the case. 
Source: Own elaboration 
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This thesis has the form of a case study. Its goal is to contribute for the 
knowledge of the family business phenomenon through the example of JM. It 
will try to understand how JM could achieve its longevity and why is this issue 
so important for the family business subject.  
In this thesis we follow Sharma (1997: 2) et al.’s definition of family 
business “as a business governed and/or managed on a sustainable, potentially 
cross-generational, basis to shape and perhaps pursue the formal or implicit 
vision of the business held by members of the same family or a small number of 
families”. Thus, we consider JM as a family firm although there are other 
shareholders and it is public traded. 
3. Evidence 
3.1. Jerónimo Martins 
Table 1 Accountancy, Financial and Operational Indicators (in current prices) 
Un.: €000 
 1922 1932 1992 2002 2012 
Size (assets) 55* 50* 461.366 2.988.725**** 4.892.973 
Sales & 
Services 
N/A N/A 819.773.648 4.515.629.000 10.876.000.000 
EBITDA 4,687** 0,436** 63.950.477 308.761.000 765.000.000 
No. of Shops N/A N/A 119** 888 2.538 
Selling Area 
(m2) 
N/A N/A 180.900** 673.719 1.882.889 
Notes: 
* Constant prices  
** Refers to Profits and not EBITDA. Also in constant prices.  
*** Refers to 1994 and not 1992 
**** Refers to 2004 
 
Table 2 Type of Corporation 
1922-1938 1939-1988 1989-2013 




Table 3 Governance System 
1922-1938 2007-2013 
Latin Model Anglo-Saxon model 
 































Dimension 6 3 2 2 2 2 5 7 9 11 7 9 9 9 11 
Family 
members 
3 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 6 6 2 3 3 3 3 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Source: Own elaboration 
Source: Own elaboration 
Source: Own elaboration 
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JM is one of the biggest Portuguese companies. It has a strong presence 
in distribution in Portugal and Poland and a joint-venture with Unilever since 
1949. This family firm with more than two centuries has overcome difficult times, 
as the crisis in 2001, in which JM had to restructure and face a downscoping 
and a tough debt reduction programme. 
 
This crisis came after a wave of diversification and internationalization; 
however, the company reacted on time, divested where it was necessary, 
reduced its debt in 410M € and focused on the distribution business in Portugal 
and Poland1. JM also learned that it should not be over-confident but extremely 
aware of the constant changes in consumer behaviour and needs in order to 
finetune its services. 
 
Since then, JM has increased net sales and services, profits and market 
capitalization. The next few years will be very important for its strategy. The firm 
and the family are starting a new wave of diversification and internationalization. 
In February 2013, JM launches its first supermarkets in Colombia and 
announces that if all goes as planned it will enter another South American 
market afterwards.  
 
JM’s history can be divided into two phases: the Martins and the dos 
Santos phases. Each generation and most leaders had important strategic 
decisions and achievements that contributed to JM success over time 
(Sequeira, 1942; Mónica, 1990; Duarte, 1998; Lima, 2003; Fernandes, 2003, 
2011; Coelho, 2004; Jerónimo Martins, 2013; Fundação Francisco Manuel dos 
Santos, 2013).  
 
Figure 2 Phases and generations 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                 
1
 Poland has been the main contributor for JM’s results, accounting for  61,9% of its sales in 2012 
(Annual Report, 2012). 
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3.2. Martins’ Phase 
 
Figure 3 Martins' family tree 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
JM is founded in 1792 when a young Galician called Jerónimo Martins 
opens his small store, or as it was mentioned in official documents, a “tent”, in 
Chiado. Soon it is promoted to a grocery shop and in 1797 it becomes the main 
supplier of the Royal Household and of most of the embassies in Lisbon. The 
business prospers steadily and in 1825 Jerónimo gives a stake to his son 
Domingos dos Santos Martins, who, after his father’s death, in 1831, runs the 
store and improves it further. 
 
In 1859, shortly after the early death of Domingos dos Santos Martins, 
his widow (his 2nd wife), and his two sons establish a company to run the store. 
Domingos dos Santos Martins Jr. (son of the second marriage) has numerous 
gambling debts and is involved in harmful parallel businesses. He leads the 
store to a difficult situation and is convinced by his mother and brother to leave. 
In 1878, João António Martins, the eldest brother of DSM Jr., sells his own cars, 
horses, furniture, silverware and his home building so that he can start paying 
the huge debts of JM. The list of creditors was extensive and included the King, 
the Prime-Minister and great aristocrats. The dignity and energy of João 
António Martins transformed an almost bankrupt firm into a successful one. In 
1884, he gives a stake in JM to his five best employees. When he dies, in 1890, 
the only heir is his friend Júlio César Pereira de Melo, who runs JM in 
conjunction with the other employees. The establishment’s name remains the 
same, but in 1918 the consequences of the Great War (e.g. increase of the cost 
of living, increase of unemployment and food supply disruption) and the 
inexistence of heirs committed to the business again bring JM to tough times. 
 
3.3. Dos Santos Phase 
Figure 4 Dos Santos' family tree 
Source: Lima, 2003 
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3.3.1. The first generation 
Francisco Manuel dos Santos (FMS), from humble ancestors, is born in 
1876. When he is 10 years old, with a limited knowledge of reading, writing and 
arithmetic, he moves to Oporto to be a grocer’s assistant. Later, self-employed 
in the same business, he starts making money and building useful professional 
networking. In 1920, he and 11 other retailers come together and establish 
Grandes Armazéns Reunidos (GAR), a big Wholesale company at that time in 
Oporto. In 1921, GAR acquires JM, moves its headquarters to Lisbon and 
changes its name to Estabelecimentos Jerónimo Martins & Filhos because of 
JM’s history. FMS takes a loan from a bank in which he offers as a guarantee 
"his work and his honesty". 
 
A restructuring begins and the chain of retail stores is expanded, allowing 
the recovery and growth of JM. They also acquire shares in some food factories 
and get involved in manufacturing.  
 
In 1925, some partners and Board members leave JM. The board, 
initially composed by six members, is now composed by FMS, Elísio Pereira do 
Valle and José Marçal Nunes, who was one of the five employees having a 
stake in JM. 
 
3.3.2. The second generation 
Elísio Alexandre dos Santos (EAS), son-in-law and nephew of FMS, born 
in 1907, departs to Angola when he is 14 due to economic difficulties. Ten years 
later, he returns and because of his professionalism and the total trust 
demonstrated by the dos Santos and the Pereira do Vale families, he is asked 
to join the firm in 1935 and to manage it three years later. He begins with an 
employee status and only later he is given a share of 1,8%. This is very 
important because with this small share he is able to decide when there is a 
deadlock between the two families (which have an equal share). This also 
shows how much he is trusted.  
 
JM becomes one of the major economic groups during the 40’s. After 
Elísio’s debut in JM, the firm invests strategically in a factory of margarine, an 
important product during World War II, and establishes a manufacturing 
company called FIMA in 1944. FIMA establishes, in 1949, a joint-venture with 
Unilever in Portugal (that still remains in effect today). It is not an easy decision, 
the Unilever representative hesitates and former JM’s boss FMS seriously 
questions the effectiveness of the business.   
 
While Lever was previously linked to cleaning products, the joint-venture 
buys Olá, in 1959, and thus it enters the ice-cream industry (production and 
distribution). In 1970, Iglo (frozen food) is acquired by the joint-venture.  
 
Maria de Lurdes Modesto tells that EAS, or ‘Father Alexandre’ as they 
called him, was seen in Lisbon as the “lion of commerce”, a role model. He was 
very demanding but fair and caring about his employees. He had a paternalistic 
spirit and was feared and worshipped at the same time. When there was some 
problem employees would talk to him. 
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3.3.3.The third generation 
Because EAS was very much respected at JM’s Group, the first years 
with Alexandre Soares dos Santos (ASS) controlling JM were not easy: “when I 
made any decision, people would tell me ‘your father would not do that’. Until 
the day I decided to say that my father was in the cemetery and that they would 
have to go there to talk to him. Since then, I was myself. I felt confident”2 
 
ASS, the current chairman, is a charismatic leader. His vision and the 
boldness of his leadership as well as his capacity to inspire thousands of 
employees are credited to be some of the reasons for the prevailing success of 
JM. He becomes JM’s leader in 1967, after being in Brazil as Unilever’s 
Marketing Director. When manufacturing is still dominant in their results, ASS is 
the first one to realise that the future of JM requires building a strong presence 
in Modern Distribution. 
 
In 1978 JM returns to distribution, its original activity, establishing an 
extensive network of superstores. Between 1980 and 1995, it develops the 
supermarket’s chain Pingo Doce, hypermarkets Feira Nova, Recheio 
cash&carries, marketing and brand representation services through Jerónimo 
Martins Distribuição and Hussel, a new chain retail specialist for chocolates and 
candies. This expansion is through growth, acquisitions and strategic alliances, 
first with Delhaize in Pingo Doce; then with Ahold in Pingo Doce and Feira 
Nova; with Booker in Recheio; and with Douglas in Hussel. 
 
According to ASS, this strategy to return to Food Distribution was due to 
Portugal entering EU and the free flow of goods. JM had to protect its 
investment and prevent Unilever from wishing to bring an end to the joint-
venture. “If they controlled production, we had to control distribution (…) It was 
by chance that internalization came up, because the only thing we wanted was 
to protect the joint-venture. The result is: a joint-venture that represented 90% 
of JM’s profits now accounts to 5%”. 
 
Between 1995 and 2000, JM internationalises: Poland (Eurocash 
cash&carries; Biedronka stores and Jumbo hypermarkets), Brazil (Sé 
Supermarkets) and England (Lillywhites sports retailer). It also diversifies its 
business portfolio by starting the ‘in store banking’ activity in conjunction with 
BCP bank (Expresso Atlântico), by having a share at Oniway 
(telecommunications) and by entering in the Water and Tourism sector 
acquiring Vidago, Melgaço & Pedras Salgadas.  
 
As a result of this expansion, JM’s debt in 2000 reaches the € 1.3 billion 
mark. Between 2001 and 2005, there is a financial restructuring programme, all 
the assets not related to the food business are sold and JM leaves Brazil and 
England to focus on its core business area and reduce its debt level.  
 
As ASS later admitted, “it was nonsense to go to Brazil. It is a very 
different market, with powerful competitors, both locals and foreigners, very 
                                                 
2
 Mota Ribeiro, A. (2012, September 2). “Entrevista Alexandre Soares dos Santos: Para que lhe serve o 
dinheiro?”. Público 2. Pp. 13-20. 
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strong and with a lot of money. We have no balance sheet for the market, (but) 
due to a stupid pride I was convinced that we would make it” (Pinheiro-Alves, 
2011: 399). 
After rigorous and professional downscoping, JM returns to profit. 
 
3.3.4.The Fourth Generation 
In 2004, ASS is replaced by Luís Palha and later, in 2010, Pedro Soares 
dos Santos (PSS) becomes CEO. He is known by his very operational and hard 
worker character and he is seen as the responsible for the success in Poland. 
Between 2005 and 2010, Pingo Doce consolidates its leading position 
and Biedronka opens its 1000 store. There is the rebranding and formal merger 
between Pingo Doce and Feira Nova and JM successfully creates Amanhecer 
product brands and stores. JM becomes one of the main employers in Portugal. 
In 2011, JM decides to expand to Colombia, through a Greenfield strategy, 
opening its first supermarkets in 2013. 
 
3.4. Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos (SFMS) 
SFMS, the family holding and JM’s main shareholder, was constituted in 
1941. ASS (through Sindcom) is the main holder and has a share of 38,67% at 
SFMS (Fernandes, 2011). In 2009, SFMS created the Francisco Manuel dos 
Santos Foundation (FFMS), a project that, according to its Chairman António 
Barreto (2013)3, promotes “the study of Portugal, in order to contribute to the 
development of its society, the improvement of its public institutions and the 
consolidation of its citizens' rights”. In 2012, SFMS entered a new business area 
(Health) creating the Walk’in Clinics. It also considers investing in agriculture 
and/ or education in Portugal. 
4. Evidence discussion 
4.1. Family and Business 
The management of this interaction is essential at JM. There is a clear 
distinction between the family and the business. Family issues, concerns and 
conflicts are managed at SFMS and do not enter the JM’s sphere. The primary 
function of the family is to be a shareholder and “being a shareholder does not 
entitle one to employment, but to choose a board and receive dividends in case 
of profits” (Alexandre Soares dos Santos, 2013). In JM’s history, some family 
members have been asked to leave the company. 
 
Another relevant issue about JM is how the new members of the family 
are trained. The new generations go to family business programs and, while 
they are still young, they are lectured about business issues; moreover, they are 
told what their role is. According to ASS, the creation of FFMS also allows 
underlining some of the company’s values to family members; they must have 
                                                 
3
 Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos (2013) What is the Foundation. [online] Available at: 
http://www.ffms.pt/ [Accessed: 23 Feb 2013]. 
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social responsibility and return to the country the opportunities that were given 
to them. There is also the concern that they become citizens of the world; that 
they become independent, gain experience and compare habits while working 
abroad.  
 
There is a family pact which rules, for example, who works at the 
company, how to be eligible, to what positions and what CV one must have. At 
the end of the day, JM is a multinational public firm that must be managed in a 
professional way for the benefit of the business and the family. Members must 
be professional and competent; they must be the first to lead by example 
through complete transparency and flawless conduct.  
 
Conflicts may always happen, whether in family or non-family firms. In 
JM, there is the family pact. Different interests are debated among family 
members. Conflicts must be addressed in a quick and frontal manner, no matter 
how difficult they are, for the benefit of most shareholders and not only some. 
This is very important because if family conflicts are not solved at SFMS level 
they risk entering the JM sphere. This is mandatory in JM: to protect investment 
and avoid familial frictions to harm the company.  
 
4.1.1. Capital Structure and Corporate Governance 
ASS considers that JM is not a family firm but a firm in which a family 
detains a very important stake. In this publicly traded company, 56.1% belongs 
to SFMS, 16.8% belongs to other four qualified shareholders and the remaining 
(27.1%) is floating and own shares.4 Although they can buy Stock Exchange 
shares of the company, no family member is individually a JM qualified 
shareholder; the family has one single voice at JM level. 
 
The Group is managed taking into consideration all shareholders, all are 
entitled to thorough and transparent information, SFMS receives the same 
information as other shareholders.  
 
Management is highly professional; it follows several recommendations 
of the Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992) and, since 2007, adopts the "Anglo-
Saxon" model of Governance formed by specialised committees and the 
following corporate bodies: the Shareholders' Meeting, the Board of Directors, 
the Audit Committee and the Chartered Accountant.5 As discussed earlier, the 
adoption of Governance systems and mechanisms has many advantages for 
family firms; nevertheless, the “Anglo-Saxon” model is market-oriented and the 
shareholder influence on management is weak, protecting therefore individual 
shareholders by strict regulation. Another aspect of this model in family firms is 
the general division between shareholders and managers (Cernat, 2004). 
 
Currently the Board includes Executive, Non-executive and Independent 
directors. The latter two, besides the possibility of new perspectives, offer a 
variety of technical skills, networking and links with national and international 
organisations. All the members are elected by unanimity and have an extensive 
                                                 
4
  Annual Report 2012. 
5
 See Appendix 
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curriculum, international experience and ambitious plans for JM’s growth. Since 
2001, the Board has foreign members including former Unilever’s directors and 
the current CFO of Heerema Group (qualified shareholder of JM). 
 
Following Bammens et al.’s (2007) idea about the Board across 
generations, it is possible to recognise changes during the dos Santos’ phase. 
While in the first three years it consisted of six inside members, of which only 
FMS, Elísio Pereira do Valle and José Marçal Nunes (until his death in 1929) 
remained afterwards, nowadays it is structured (as explained on the previous 
paragraph) in order to cope with the needs of a multinational public firm.  
 
Interestingly, in 1995, when the diversification and internationalisation 
began, there were no foreign members and the ratio of family members on the 
Board was 2/3 (6 out of 9). In 2000, when net losses were €64 million and the 
debt level was twice the amount of 1997’s, family members were 6 among 11. 
In 2012, when net profits were €360 million and EBITDA was almost four times 
the amount of 2000, the ratio was nearly 1/4 (3 of 11). It does not mean that 
Portuguese or family members are less competent because there is no linear 
relationship between each member and JM’s results and one of the family 
members that left the Board in 2000 returned in 2004. Instead, it suggests the 
need to incorporate expertise and different points-of-view in order to compete in 
different markets - following the opinion of some authors about the need of 
outside and non-family members, and a varied Board (Ward, 2005). 
 
4.1.2. Performance and Entrepreneurship 
As the last chapter will discuss, JM’s culture is distinguished by its 
pioneering spirit and external orientation. Its DNA, combined with family 
involvement, long-term orientation and incentives not limited to financial reward, 
supports an entrepreneurial behaviour and contributes to the sustainability of 
the firm. The presence of external investors and independent and non-family 
directors at JM reinforces this behaviour.  
 
JM has always been entrepreneur and innovative, especially since the 
third generation of the Dos Santos’ phase, in which there was a focus on 
consumers’ needs. Entrepreneurship is risky and some decisions were 
hazardous; however, as ASS stated, “one of the characteristics of JM is to learn 
from mistakes and quickly implement a correction. I always tell my 
grandchildren and employees that the word ‘defeat’ is not on our dictionary. The 
return from Brazil brought us humility and focus. Things can go wrong, the 
opponent may have scored a goal; but we will have to react and, at least, to end 
in a draw” (Mota-Ribeiro, 2012).  It is also important to step back at the right 
time and that was what happened when some diversifications proved 
unsuccessful. 
 
Every diversification started in 1996 had a reason. Lillywhites, for 
example, was an attempt to introduce the non-food at JM and enter the UK 
market. The Group needed to grow and to seek new formulas. Yet, it was a new 
market and new activity at a time in which JM was also starting in Poland and 
having many investments. With this business and geographic diversification JM 
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learned that investments must be done step-by-step; hence, in the next five 
years JM is unwilling to start something new while it is focussed into making the 
Colombia operation successful. Everything must be well-thought-out because a 
bad decision can ruin years of work.  
 
Walk’in Clinics was a diversification attempt of SFMS, which has 
everything invested at JM; however, it is now being debated whether this kind of 
investment should be carried by JM or SFMS. The solution may be JM’s sub-
holdings creating these investments to sell them afterwards to SFMS, but that is 
not clear yet. ASS believes that maintaining investment is vital for family firms, 
because if people become used to dividends and having more money they will 
become conservative and risk-averse.  
 
It is possible to find similarities between the dos Santos’ phase and Cruz 
et al.’s (2012) theory. In the first generation FMS and EPV were fundamental 
for restructuring JM and expanding its network of retail stores; in the second 
one, interpretations of the competitive environment (the importance of 
manufacturing and margarine) influenced EAS; and in the third generation and 
beyond, the access to non-family resources strengthened its entrepreneurship. 
The family stake of 56% is also very close of the 53% family ownership 




 A careful succession planning is vital for the success and longevity of 
firms and the same applies to JM. Merit is at the basis of its culture and the 
same happens in successions, in which an Evaluation and Nomination 
Committee analyses who has more conditions to achieve success. Candidates 
must follow a set of requirements and then start a defined career. This 
Committee has started to analyse PSS fifteen years ago. His role on 
Biedronka’s development and Pingo Doce’s repositioning, combined with his 
profile, adequate for the company’s contemporary challenges, all influenced 
succession in 2010. Luís Palha was very important, particularly in JM’s 
recovery, but then, at a time in which expansion was the strategy, PSS became 
the ideal successor6. 
 
In 2004, ASS decided to leave his CEO position. There was a great 
expectation and three people were equated to replace him; his two sons, Pedro 
and José, and Luís Palha, CFO at that time and seen as responsible for the 
financial turnaround. Thus, ASS was replaced by Luís Palha before, in 2010, 
PSS would be unanimously elected CEO. ASS knew of PSS’ qualities, vision 
and leadership. However, PSS needed time to mature until he became a natural 
choice. The election of Luís Palha, besides being the best decision at the time, 
also served to show that skills alone would determine the final choice. 
 
So far, numbers suggest that it was an effective succession: between 
2010 and 2012, sales increased more than €3.5 billion (nearly 14%) and the 
                                                 
6
 Nobre, A. (2013, April 13). Jerónimo Martinss, uma sucessão com resultados imunes à crise. Expresso 
Economia. Pp. 20/21. 
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share price increased 109%. Net profits in 2012 were €360 million, an 
improvement of 80% compared to 20097. 
 
Following Sonnenfeld and Spence (1989), it is possible to characterise 
ASS’s departure as corresponding to the Ambassador style. Since 2004, ASS 
left day-to-day operations to deal with the long-term of JM as Chairman. The 
new venture in Colombia influenced ASS to stay another mandate in 2013. 
Brazil’s venture was not forgotten and his experience and counselling are 
essential; on the other hand, a new Chairman at this stage would not be easily 
integrated in the current strategy. His departure has been progressive - as 
Pontet et al. (2007) suggest as adequate.  
 
4.2. Generational issues 
If we take a look at the 221 years of JM’s history, we learn that the firm 
grew along generations. In both phases, it is during the third generation that the 
company faced difficult times and recovered. But while in the Martins’ Phase it 
was another third generation member who recovered JM, in the Dos Santos’ 
Phase it was the same leader. Moreover, the Pereira do Valle family’s tenure 
did not reach a fourth generation and the family sold its stake at JM in 1989. 
 
Regarding the Dos Santos’ Phase, although each generation continued 
the family legacy, vision and culture, each one was able to introduce its own 
viewpoint with a well-defined strategy. The first generation was important to 
expand and turn the JM’s grocery shop to a chain of retail stores and start 
commercialising Unilever products. The second one expanded activities to 
manufacturing, established a joint-venture with Unilever, expanded to Africa and 
turned the company into an important Group. The third one led JM back to 
distribution, to internationalise and to become one of the top Portuguese 
companies. Finally, the fourth generation continued the internationalisation 
process and further improved results. 
 
4.2.1.Organizational culture 
Each one of the Dos Santos’s leaders influenced JM’s culture. “Founder/ 
owners often start with humanistic and social concerns that become reflected in 
organizational structure and process” (Schein, 1983: 25) and it is possible to 
identify this continuity of values across generations.  
 
In the first generation, JM is the first company, in Portugal, paying its 
employees the 13th month of salary, builds a canteen and creates a summer 
camp. FMS also paid his employees’ studies. In the second generation, this 
concern about employees is maintained. In 1955, there was a library, reading-
room and Drama Group (culture); games-room and football team (sports), and 
an annual Christmas party with gifts for employees’ children. In 1958 Fima-
Lever-Thibaud’s employees launch the first monthly newsletter. In the third 
generation, social responsibility is strengthened, JM creates an award and a 
fund to help employees with seized wages. 
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 Annual Report 2012. 
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This behaviour reinforced employees’ commitment and they started to 
feel an important part of the company, like belonging to a family, helping JM to 
keep its best people. This is one of the considerations they have regarding the 
future and try to pass to new generations. Furthermore, this and the fact that JM 
offers its employees good conditions and salaries above-average, the existance 
of works councils and ASS’s neutral position in the country’s political life may 
have helped the group to overcome without any major problems the April 25th 
Revolution, in 1974, and the turmoil that followed. 
 
The self-made-man and entrepreneur character of FMS was continued 
by generations who were never risk-averse. JM’s culture is, nowadays, 
recognised by its pioneer, innovative and competitive spirit; rigour; 
transparency; professionalism; external orientation; fair and challenging HR 
practices; and principles of integrity and corporate and social responsibility.  
 
Often, a family firm cannot attract or retain its best non-family managers 
because they feel their careers will stagnate at a certain level due to family 
issues. However, JM’s merit culture and the presence of non-family members in 
key positions (eg. Luis Palha’s CEO tenure)8 suggest that any competent 
manager, disregard of his family ties, can progress in JM.    
 
This firm, where everybody arrives at business meetings at least fifteen 
minutes before schedule, follows the “participative culture” in Dyer’s (1988) 
criteria. This culture is somewhat rare and helps family firms to react promptly to 
changes, foster new ideas and improve decision making.  
5. Conclusion 
The success of family firms depends heavily on how the family manages 
this intermingle between the family and the business and not so much on family 
or business resources (Olson et al., 2003). While preparing this case study, we 
found there was a clear distinction between family issues, SFMS and JM. There 
is a set of pre-established steps and rules for family members, who must 
dialogue, discuss their vision and aims and reach a consensus for the family 
and the company’s sake. Concerns, conflicts and other family issues are, thus, 
discussed in the family sphere. In the business sphere, the family has one 
single voice and the shareholder influence on management is weak due to the 
strict regulation of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model. 
 
At an early stage, they learn family’s and business’ values that will drive 
them in the future. They keep in mind their origins and the best tribute to FMS is 
to respect this project and improve it. JM is not seen as a mere economic thing. 
Each generation had an important strategy to help the firm’s growth and the 
family project.  ASS admits the third/fourth generation’s story is true, but it only 
happens if new generations do not understand what the company is and just 
care about its market value. Thus, it is mandatory to have an earnest and loyal 
attitude and to pass these values to new generations. 
 
                                                 
8
 It is important to mention that Luis Palha did not start his career at JM and started there as CFO. 
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JM is a multinational public firm and must be managed accordingly, using 
the best business’ practices and methods. It must be competitive, have the best 
human resources and always protect its investment in order to achieve 
longevity and success. Unlike some cases in which family issues and conflicts 
weaken the firm, we can infer the opposite. The success and the professional 
way in which JM is managed strengthen the family’s harmony and unity.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The Dos Santos’ family turned JM into what it is now due to their unity. 
Yet, not all family firms are alike and what resulted to JM may not happen 
exactly the same way in other firms. 
 
Due to JM’s 221 years, we were not able to find annual results since the 
foundation of the company (1792). Even more so because there were periods in 
which JM was a limited liability company. 
 
Also, the Family Business subject is a complex research field. It is 
difficult to present an overview of JM’s 221 years and, simultaneously, analyse 
deeply all the related important topics with a 10.000 words limit. Hence, it may 
be also interesting to focus on some of the discussed topics only, especially 
regarding shareholder structure; corporate governance; entrepreneurial 
behaviour; succession and the importance of each generation.  
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Figure 5 The Dos Santos' Family Tree 
 





1792 JM is founded. 
 
1797 JM Becomes the main supplier of the Royal Household and of most of the 
embassies in Lisbon. 
 
1831 Domingos dos Santos Martins runs JM and improves it even more. 
 
1859 Domingos dos Santos Martins (“Jr.”) runs JM and lets the store in a difficult 
situation. 
 
1878 João António Martins, half-brother of Domingos dos Santos Martins (“Jr.”), 
transformed an almost bankrupt firm into a successful one. 
 
1890 João António Martins dies and the only heir is his friend Dr. Júlio César Pereira 
de Melo, who runs JM in conjunction with the five best employees who have a 
stake at JM. 
 
1921 GAR acquires JM, a restructuring begins and the chain of retail stores is 
expanded. The most important shareholders and directors are Francisco 
Manuel dos Santos and Elísio Pereira do Valle.   
 
1938 Elísio Alexandre dos Santos becomes JM’s leader. 
 
1944 JM establishes a manufacturing company called FIMA. 
 
1949 FIMA establishes a joint-venture with Unilever. 
 
1959/1970 The joint-venture acquires Olá (ice-creams) and Iglo (frozen food). 
 
1967 Alexandre Soares dos Santos becomes JM’s leader. 
 
1974 The April 25th Revolution against the fascist dictatorship of Estado Novo takes 
place. Many companies (the ones in key strategic areas) are nationalized and 
the families of its owners are forced into exile. However, JM overcomes without 
any major surprises this troubled time. The managers and the family remain in 
Portugal and JM offers new jobs in Portugal for the employees returned from 
Angola. 
 
1978 JM returns to distribution, its original activity, by establishing an extensive 
network of superstores. 
 
1985 JM becomes a holding company and sets up a joint-venture with the second 
largest Belgian retailer, Delhaize "Le Lion", to develop the supermarket’s chain 
Pingo Doce. Jerónimo Martins Distribuição (JMD) is also set up in order to 
follow the company's traditional operations, brand representation. 
 
1988 JM continues to grow and acquires 60% of Recheio, a cash & carry company. 
A great fire destroys the JM offices and the historical store on Rua Garrett. One 
year later, JM enters in the olive oil sector, buying the company that produced 
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Gallo. Acquires the remaining 40% of the Recheio chain, SFMS acquires the 
remaining shares of the Vale’s family in JM and this one is launched on the 
Stock Market. 
 
1990 The group diversifies its asset portfolio by founding Hussel, a new chain retail 
specialist for chocolates and candies, in conjunction with the German company 
Douglas AG. Also in that year, JM acquires one of the biggest cash & carries 
hypermarkets in Portugal, being a strong contribute for its activities in wholesale 
Distribution. One year later, this is driven with the joint-venture with the British 
Booker group, the major food wholesaler in the UK. 
 
1992 JM makes a strategic repositioning. Buys to Delhaize "Le Lion" its share in the 
group's retail business and sets up a joint venture with the Dutch company 
Royal Ahold (one of the world’s largest Food Retail companies and which still 
has 49% in Jerónimo Martins Distribuição (Retail), the holding company that 
controls Pingo Doce). This year is also marked by the introduction of private 
brands, the start of a retail’s multi-format strategy and an acceleration of its 
growth.  
 
1993 JM in conjunction with Ahold acquires a holding company in which will allow 
them to control more 56 supermarkets and 8 cash & carries. Later in that year, 
JM announces the acquisition of more than 90 stores. In manufacturing FIMA 
acquires another olive oil producer and becomes the national leader in this 
sector.  
 
1994 Poor expectations about the distribution sector in Portugal and cash flow 
problems lead JM to decide to internationalize. Poland is the chosen country 
and the expansion occurs in 1995 with the acquisition of the Polish cash & 
carries Eurocash, in conjunction with Booker. The Biendronka project starts that 
year as well. 
 
1996 JM acquires Lillywhites (a famous sports retailer) in the UK and, in Portugal, in 
an unprecedented joint-venture with the BCP bank, JM starts the ‘in store 
banking’ activity launching the Expresso Atlântico "stores". JM also buys 
Vidago, Melgaço & Pedras Salgadas (VMPS), producers and distributors of the 
brand leader in bottled water.  
 
1997 JM continues its internalization process and goes to Brazil with the acquisition 
of Sé supermarkets. In Poland, the group materialises its purchasing option in 
Biedronka.  
 
1998 The Booker’s stake in Recheio (Portugal) and in Eurocash (Poland) is bought 
by JM. Pingo Doce launches the first virtual supermarket in Portugal and 
Biedronka continues to open new stores.  
 
2000 The venture in Brazil does not go as planned and this is reflected in the 
financial results. JM’s debt reaches the 1.3 billion euros.  
 




2002 Lillywhites and Sé supermarkets are sold too.  
 
2003 JM returns to profit. 
 
2004 Through a management buy-out operation, Eurocash (in Poland) is sold in 
order to JM focus on its the prosperous Biedronka project. The alienation of 
unprofitable businesses allows JM to strengthen their core business and 
structure. 
 
2005 A greater operational efficiency and a highly competitive pricing policy, being 
practiced lately, leads to an increment of the competitiveness of its distribution 
brands in Portugal and Poland, even in a tough economic situation. JM also 
creates a training school for its employees.  
 
2006 JM continues to grow and extend its actions to Social Responsibility policies. In 
manufacturing, JM and Unilever decide to set up a single company, Unilever 
JM. 
 
2007 Pingo Doce consolidates its leading position and Biedronka open its 1000 
store. In Portugal, Pingo Doce and Recheio claim to be the first companies in 
the world, in Distribution, “to certify the development and follow-up of their 
Private Brands”. Also in Portugal, JM becomes one of the main employers. 
 
2008 In Services, they open the chili’s restaurant (casual dining) in conjunction with 
Brinker International.  
 
2009 JM launches the food products brand Amanhecer which is a success and, 
consequently, leads to the creation of Amanhecer stores, a traditional retail 
project between the former store owners and Recheio. Also in 2009, there is the 
formal merger between Pingo Doce and Feira Nova.  
 
2010 Pingo Doce launches Take Away and restaurant services.  
 
2011 JM activity in Portugal and Poland grows and Colombia is the third chosen 
country for JM’s expansion.  
 
2012 SFMS enters into a new business area (Health), creating the Walk’in Clinics. 
 
2013 JM opens its first supermarkets in Colombia and expects to have 40 










Table 5: JM’s Financial Indicators in current prices: Last 20 years 
Un. Eur 000 
 Sales & Services EBITDA 
1993 1.492.000 102.083 
1994 1.620.000 143.430 
1995 2.006.000 160.133 
1996 2.493.000 211.666 
1997 2.814.000 269.464 
1998 2.955.000 337.646 
1999 3.263.000 377.250 
2000 4.871.490 241.553 
2001 5.048.793 297.539 
2002 4.515.629 308.761 
2003 3.881.512 329.013 
2004 3.871.459 337.685 
2005 4.127.539 332.100 
2006 4.611.599 333.582 
2007 5.434.048 356.951 
2008 6.827.779 468.431 
2009 7.412.358 534.930 
2010 8.691.000 624.000 
2011 9.838.000 722.000 
2012 10.876.000 765.000 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 6 JM's activities 
 
Source: own elaboration  
 
 
Figure 7 Shareholder Struture 
 












































Figure 8 Corporate and Business Structure 
 




Figure 9 Values and core competencies 
 
Source: Jerónimo Martins Annual Report 2010 
 
 
